Ensuring adequate electrical capacity in New England by Carrie Conaway
A settlement accepted by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission on June
15, 2006, may finally resolve years of dis-
agreement over how to increase New
England’s electrical capacity.  The final
settlement was signed by 107 of the 115
parties negotiating for four months to cre-
ate a forward capacity market for electrici-
ty in the region. Despite such strong sup-
port, however, several important parties
oppose the plan, and its economic impact
on the region is not yet clear.
Background
New England’s deregulated electricity
market has not provided sufficient incen-
tives for investment in new capacity.
While substantial new capacity came
online immediately after deregulation was
adopted, this burst mainly filled demand
built up during years of uncertainties
about how deregulation would play out.
Investment has since slowed; in 2005 the
region added only 11 megawatts of capaci-
ty. The problems are particularly severe in
eastern Massachusetts, southwestern
Connecticut, and northwestern Vermont,
where strong demand, limited generating
capacity, and barriers to importing electric-
ity threaten local service reliability. In
some areas, ISO New England, the inde-
pendent group that monitors the region’s
wholesale markets, has had to issue “relia-
bility must-run” contracts, paying genera-
tors that otherwise would not operate or
would operate at reduced levels to produce
more electricity.
In April 2003, FERC asked the ISO to
develop a market-based mechanism to
ensure adequate incentives for meeting
the region’s future needs.  About a year
later, the ISO proposed a “locational
installed capacity market” (LICAP) under
which the ISO would have allocated pay-
ments within five geographical zones
based on a formula that reflected the fact
that capacity is more valuable when it is
more scarce.  As capacity decreased, capac-
ity prices and payments would have
increased. The goal was to help ensure
reliability by paying for the capacity need-
ed to meet both day-to-day requirements
and system reliability needs.  
LICAP was opposed by almost every-
one in the energy community except for
the ISO, the administrative law judge
assigned to the proceedings, and the gen-
erators themselves.  Opponents felt the
cost of the payments to generators was too
high, particularly since there was no
requirement that the new capacity actual-
ly be online when it was most needed and
since it represented a potential windfall to
generators that were already in the market.  
The region’s energy 
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FERC twice delayed implementing
LICAP but said it would be implemented in
October 2006 if no agreement were other-
wise reached. This ruling precipitated the
negotiations among LICAP opponents that
ultimately led to FERC’s June 15 approval of
the landmark settlement agreement. 
Terms of the agreement
Under the forward capacity market plan,
ISO New England is responsible for creating
three-year forecasts of expected regional
capacity needs.  To secure that capacity and
determine its price, ISO will conduct auc-
tions at which electrical generators will bid
the number of kilowatt-hours they will be
willing to supply at an initial bidding price
set by ISO.  If more resources are bid than
the capacity needed, the price is lowered,
and generators re-bid until the amount of
capacity bid equals the amount needed.
The first auction is set for early 2008 to cover
capacity needs anticipated for the year
beginning June 1, 2010.
Other key elements of the agreement:
When bidding into the auction, genera-
tors adding new capacity would have the
option to commit that capacity (and thereby
lock in its price) for between one and five
years.  The longer periods are meant to
encourage new investment in capacity by
guaranteeing financial backers a rate of
return for the first few years of operation.  
While new generation will set the auc-
tion price, every generator in the market—
existing and new—will receive the same
price for each kilowatt of capacity it pro-
vides.
In order to ensure that capacity is avail-
able when really needed and to help prevent
generators from exploiting their market
power to drive up prices during times of
peak demand, generators will be required to
bid into the market and will face financial
penalties if they bid into the system and
then are not available when demand spikes.  
ISO will determine whether separate
auctions are needed to adjust for geographic
differences in available capacity.
For the first time in the United States,
reductions in demand through energy effi-
ciency and demand response programs, as
well as increases in supply from intermittent
resources such as wind power, will be consid-
ered capacity and will be rewarded equally.
During the transition into the forward
capacity markets, generators will receive
fixed payments based on the number of kilo-
watt-hours of electricity they produce to
help ensure short-run reliability.
Support and opposition
More than three-quarters of the genera-
tors, transmitters, distributors, end users,
and alternative resources that participate in
New England’s wholesale electrical market
approved the settlement. A key reason is
that they see its costs as significantly less
than LICAP, which was to go into effect in
October if no alternate agreement were
reached.  In addition, longer-term savings
from forward capacity markets, while diffi-
cult to predict, could be substantial if the
market works as expected and provides
appropriate incentives to generators to build
new capacity.  Environmental advocates also
like the proposal for the equal weight it
places on demand reduction and alternative
energy sources as capacity, relative to more
traditional sources of energy supply.
Support for the settlement is not univer-
sal, however. The attorneys general of
Massachusetts and Connecticut, the Maine
Public Utility Commission, the Maine Public
Advocate, three consumer coalitions, and
Massachusetts utility NSTAR remain
opposed. One of their primary concerns is the
settlement’s cost, particularly during the
transition period.  The ISO estimates that
forward capacity markets will provide about
$5 billion in transitional revenues to genera-
tors.  Although this is a significant savings
over what LICAP would have cost during this
period, it will still increase electricity expens-
es for end consumers.  The transition costs,
opponents argue, are not supported by either
market conditions or the cost of service and
are not necessary because of the existing reli-
ability must-run contract process.  And the
costs once the market is fully implemented,
though harder to predict, will almost certain-
ly be higher than current prices.
Most stakeholders have approved the
settlement, but several important 
parties remain opposed3
Representatives from Maine, which has
no capacity problems and in fact exports
excess electricity to other parts of the region,
are particularly opposed to the plan.
Mainers feel that in being asked to pay to
resolve capacity constraints elsewhere in the
region, they are in essence being punished
for doing a better job than other states in
building competitive electrical generation
markets.  The ISO response is that capacity
prices need to differ within the region only
to the extent that there are transmission, not
generation, constraints.  So long as Maine is
able to transmit its excess power to other
parts of the region, it can make up the cost
of the capacity payments by selling its
exports.
Other opponents cite a potential nega-
tive economic impact on the region and its
residents.  Since New England already has
the highest electrical rates in the nation,
some worry that even higher rates will be a
deterrent for businesses, particularly large
industrial firms, seeking to locate in the area.
Rates may also be prohibitively high for low-
income residents.  This again is a particular
concern for Maine, which is lagging the rest
of the region economically and has the low-
est per capita income in the region.
More broadly, opponents contend that
the current system is working.  They feel the
market-clearing price is high enough to sup-
port building peaking capacity, just not base-
load capacity, and the region does not need
more baseload capacity, which they see as a
reasonable market result.  Further, they feel
FERC did not allow ample time to come up
with a more acceptable alternative to LICAP.
As Joseph Rogers of the Massachusetts
Attorney General’s office said recently, “the
choice between the noose and the firing
squad is no choice at all.” 
Next steps and challenges
Though opponents remain unhappy with
the settlement, as of mid-summer none had
announced firm plans to formally challenge
the ruling. Meanwhile, ISO New England
must now develop rules for the transition
period.  The ISO must also determine how
Key dates in forward capacity market development
April 25, 2003 FERC asks ISO to develop a market mechanism to ensure the 
reliability of New England’s electricity system.
March 1, 2004 ISO submits a proposal for a locational installed capacity market (LICAP).
Protests are filed almost immediately.
June 2, 2004 FERC delays implementing LICAP until January 1, 2006.
August 10, 2005 FERC again delays implementing LICAP, but says LICAP will be 
implemented on October 1, 2006, unless the parties reach an 
alternate agreement.
October 21, 2005 FERC grants the LICAP opponents’ request for settlement 
proceedings to resolve the issue.  FERC Administrative Law 
Judge Stephen Brenner is put in charge of the settlement proceedings.
March 6, 2006 107 of 115 parties to the negotiations agree to a forward capacity market 
for New England and submit a settlement agreement for FERC approval.  
June 15, 2006 FERC approves the agreement.
4Q 2006 ISO is to develop rules on a range of issues, including how to calculate its
capacity requirements and how intermittent and demand-side resources 
will be included in the new market.
1Q 2008 First forward capacity auction is to take place, to cover capacity needs for
June 1, 2010 through May 31, 2011.intermittent, energy efficiency, and
demand-response resources will be incorpo-
rated into the forward capacity markets, and
how it will estimate the region’s capacity
needs in preparation for the auctions begin-
ning in 2008.
The settlement’s impact on the region’s
energy markets and economy remains uncer-
tain.  Some analysts note that planning only
three years ahead may not allow enough time
to build baseload generators fueled by any-
thing other than natural gas, since coal and
nuclear plants often take longer to site and
build.  This could further heighten the
region’s dependence on natural gas and exac-
erbate price volatility in both electricity and
home heating markets.  Others warn that
guaranteeing returns on new capacity for no
more than five years may not be enough
incentive to interest investors in generation
projects.  In this case, insufficient capacity
will be built, continuing the region’s reliabil-
ity problems of the last decade.
While the costs of forward capacity mar-
kets are certainly large and could ripple
throughout the regional economy, propo-
nents respond that doing nothing would also
have been costly.  From an economic and
business development perspective, higher
electricity rates are not necessarily a greater
negative than the possibility of rolling black-
outs and other service interruptions.
Whether forward capacity markets will solve
New England’s electrical reliability problem
remains to be seen.  But the settlement’s
broad support throughout the region—
despite important pockets of opposition—
indicates that for all its uncertainties and
risks, this agreement is perceived as a step
forward for New England’s energy markets.
I would like to thank Teresa Huie of the Research
Library for her valuable assistance in compiling the
background materials for this policy brief.
The settlement’s impact on the 
region’s energy markets and 
economy is still uncertain
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